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At the climate summit in Copenhagen, the conference of the parties (COP 15) took note of
the Copenhagen Accord, which calls for a stabilization of the greenhouse gas concentration
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system. Specically, the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees
Celsius. In order to reach this target, CO2 reductions for industrialized countries should be in
a range of -25% to -40% by 2020, and -80% to -95% by 2050. The benet of these policies lies
in (sharply) reducing the probability of large damages due to climate change. The involved
costs are related to the induced change in economic growth. They have to be evaluated with
the help of adequate quantitative models, which are based on energy input and aimed at
predicting development in the long run.
This paper develops and uses the Computable Induced Technical change and Energy
(CITE) model to predict the long-run eects of stringent carbon policies on consumption,
welfare, and sectoral development. Because the accuracy of long-term predictions crucially
depends on the quality of the included growth mechanism, the CITE model relies on the
achievements of new growth theory, specically on Romer (1990) and Grossman and Help-
man (1991). The incentives to invest in the expansion in capital varieties arise endogenously
and provide the basic mechanism for productivity and consumption growth. A key feature of
the model is that it includes the gains from specialization already in the benchmark scenario,
so that the growth mechanism is consistent among all the dierent scenarios. Furthermore,
endogenous growth is determined for each sector separately. By capturing the sectoral dier-
ences in energy intensities, the complex linkages between the sectors, and the sector-specic
investment behavior, a rich development pattern can be depicted by the model.
We apply the CITE model to the Swiss economy and nd that climate policies following
the Copenhagen Accord do not prevent consumption and sectoral outputs from growing in
the future. Compared to business-as-usual without climate change, the consumption level in
2050 is 4.5 % lower and discounted welfare decreases by 2.6 %. However, the absence of any
negative eects of climate change is not realistic: the development with undamped climate
change is likely to entail higher losses and especially higher risks in the long run, see Stern
(2007). An appropriate cost-benet analysis has to compare the costs of action with the costs
of inaction, including all types of uncertainties. According to the expectation from theory
and conrming the validity of the model, energy extensive as well as capital and knowledge
intensive sectors prot in the form of increased growth rates.
The paper builds on the fact that long-run development is best predicted by a fully dynamic
model. Since the seminal work of Solow (1956), economists view capital and technology as
the main drivers of economic growth. Moreover, increasing gains from specialization foster
economic development. This insight goes back to Adam Smith who calculated 250 years ago
already how much the division of labor increases the eciency of the labor force. Gains
from specialization were formally included in economic models by Spence (1976), Dixit and
2Stiglitz (1977), and Ethier (1982) who rened the approach by assuming that an increasing
number of intermediate inputs to production would raise output. Endogenous growth through
increasing specialization lies at the heart of one strand of so-called "new growth theory",
see Romer (1987, 1990), where output is an increasing function of intermediate goods and
new intermediate goods need innovations as up-front investments. Adding the investment
decisions and (strong enough) learning spillovers, growth becomes endogenous and continues
indenitely.
Spillovers have also played a role in previous CGE models, where learning curves are
used extensively, see e.g. Messner (1997) and Gr ubler and Messner (1998). Endogenous re-
search has been included more recently. Nordhaus (2002) introduces R&D in his DICE model
(R&DICE) and includes two forms of technological change, an economy-wide technological
change and a carbon-energy-saving technological change. Buonanno et al. (2001) enhance the
RICE model of Nordhaus & Yang (1996) and include induced technical change. The impact
of induced technical change has also been treated in Popp (2004), Kemfert (2002), Gerlagh
(2007), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Edenhofer et al. (2005),
and Bosetti et al. (2006).
This paper adds to the literature by relating the dynamics of CGE models to endogenous
growth theory, applying the framework of gains from specialization. Capital is heterogeneous,
the capital variants grow in quantity and number through physical capital investments and
innovative activities. The simulation of the model delivers results on the long-run macroeco-
nomic eects of climate policy, which are relevant for current and future energy and carbon
policy. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical
foundation of the used CITE model. In section 3, the data and the parameters are explained.
Section 4 presents the results for the post-Kyoto carbon policy for Switzerland. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
This section introduces the CITE model and presents its specic features guiding the sub-
sequent simulation of carbon policies.1 The biggest challenge of modelling is the adequate
integration of the expansion-in varieties mechanism of new growth theory into a dynamic
simulation model with many sectors and energy as a main input.
2.1 Producers
The production sector species sectoral manufacturing and input substitution as well as the
whole set intersectoral linkages in a multisector economy. All nal goods of a sector are used
in the production of all the goods, including their own production. As the energy and the
oil sectors dier from the other sectors, we use two dierent labels for the sectors: regular
1To keep the exposititon short, only the main elements are presented here; for further details see Schwark
(2010a, 2010b).
3sectors excluding energy and oil are labelled by the index n while the index for all the sectors
is i. Final goods Y in sector n, Yn (n 2 N), are manufactured under the conditions of CES
production functions using two types of inputs: a sector-specic intermediate composite Qn





















The label A reects that goods are distinguished according to origin, i.e. they are so-called
"Armington" goods which is the usual assumption in numerical simulation models. (1) reects
that all nal goods are used in the production of all the goods. The elasticity of substitution
between Qn and Yn0n, Y;n , is assumed to be smaller than unity to reect limited substitution
possibilities between the intermediate composite and nal goods as inputs. The value share
of the intermediate composite is X;n. The activity coecients an0n give the amount of each
Armington good An0n that is required for one unit of output in the Leontief function. We
chose Leontief as we consider the substitutability of these Armington goods in the production
as very weak. The energy and the oil sector produce with the same production functions,
except from the fact that the energy sector uses imported gas and the "Armington good" of
the oil sector as inputs. The oil sector additionally needs imported crude oil for production.
Each sectoral producer of a regular nal good maximizes prot under the restrictions (1):
max
Qn;tAn0n;t




subject to (1) with pH denoting the price for variable H. As the market for nal goods is



























with Dn0n being the derivative of the Leontief production structure w.r.t. the input of sector
n0 to sector n. The growth rate of the economy depends on the growth rates of the sectors.
These, in turn, result from an increase of the varieties of sectoral intermediate goods, which
is reected in the production of the sectoral intermediate composite Qi. It is produced with









4with 0 <  < 1 and xij as the employment of the jth type of specialized intermediate good. Ki
measures the number of intermediates available in sector i: Each intermediate good needs one
unit of capital in order to be produced so that Ki is at the same time a measure of the sector
specic capital stock. Qi can be raised by an increase of xij or Ki, which provides additional
diversication and thus increases the productivity by exploiting gains from diversication. 
is a measure for the substitutability of the intermediate goods with  = (Q   1)=Q and
Q > 1 being the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods. On a competitive















Intermediate goods xij;t are produced by rms that face a CES production function and
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We introduce V Kij in order to satisfy the equilibrium conditions for a balanced growth
path with heterogeneous sectors. Balanced growth is a useful assumption for the benchmark
but can only be obtained with identical capital shares between the sectors. To establish equal
sector shares at the beginning we introduce the additional input V Kij which does not grow
and thus has no impact on the dynamics of the economy when doing policy simulations (see
Section 3 for details). To determine pxij;t, there is a mark-up over marginal costs (given by
1=) because intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes for each other. The prots from
x-production are used to compensate for capital investments, which are the prerequisite for
the production of a new intermediate.
The number of capital varieties is increased by investments in physical capital (IPij) and
non-physical capital (INPij). Both types of investment are sector specic. Non-physical in-













Together with investments in physical capital, IP;ij, non-physical investments INPij;t deter-
mine capital in the next period according to
2The formulation of IR&D;ij stems from the fact that below we apply data for R&D investments from the












+ (1   )Kij;t (10)
 depicts the depreciation rate of capital. The growth index gK of the capital composite of
















+ (1   ) (11)
2.2 Consumers
A representative, innitely-lived household allocates income between consumption and invest-
ment in accordance with intertemporal utility maximization under perfect foresight. It faces
an additively separable intertemporal utility function U with consumption good C yielding


































with AnC denoting the part of regular nal good n that goes into consumption and NE;n




In order to indicate the dynamic behavior of consumption, the prices of the consumption


















Accordingly, the household faces the budget constraint
3This utility function is useful for numerical simulation; it has the same intertemporal characteristics as the








1  , see Rutherford (2004).





Hereby, V denotes the assets of the household. Total investments of the household must
equal investments in physical and in non-physical capital, Ii;t = IPi;t + INPi;t. As energy is
assumed to be a factor that is owned by the consumer, income from energy also goes to the
consumer as factor income. The budget constraint is explicitly modeled such that income
from endowments and capital is equal to consumption plus investments. The augmented








t+1((1 + rt+1)pV;tVt + wtLt + wR;tRLt














t+1(1 + rt+1) (20)
with  > 0 being the shadow price of consumption. From the rst order conditions of











Economic growth is determined by the growth rate of the capital stock, which reects in-
vestment decisions of the representative household. If gH =
Ht+1
Ht denotes the growth index
of variable H, the growth index of consumption can be derived by dividing consumption in






























C for an adjusted growth index the above equation can be simplied
and the adjusted growth rate of consumption can be reformulated as




















where  Aec = 1  CS. On a balanced growth path, CS must grow at the same rate as C and





The growth index of Qi can be calculated straightforward. Given its production function































As the growth of the intermediate goods equals zero and therefore the growth index gxi must





The above equation is the central relation in the model as it ensures endogenous growth
through gains of specialization in the production of intermediate goods. The economy is able
to growth even without growth of the inputs to intermediate goods, i.e. labor and energy.
With this and by modeling international trade with additional Armington goods as usual in
the literature5 we are ready to use the model for numerical simulation.
3 Data and Parameters
3.1 Data
For the simulation we use data from the Swiss input-output table (hereafter named IOT)
for the year 2005 (Nathani, van Nieuwkoop and Wickart (2008)), which is the most recent
version available. It gives detailed information on the ow of goods between sectors and to
nal demand and also on the use of inputs and on trade. The original table holds data for 42
4See Schwark (2010a) for details.
5see Schwark (2010a).
8production sectors and dierentiates between fteen types of consumption (twelve for private
households, three for public consumption) and three types of physical investments. As for the
use of factor inputs, it holds information on the use of labor and capital. It is therefore an
almost complete source of data for the type of model we are using.
For the purpose of our model, the original IOT was aggregated to 12 sectors (10 regular
sectors, an energy sector and an oil sector).6 The model distinguishes two types of investments,
physical and non-physical investments. Non-physical investments mainly refers to investments
in research and development. The original IOT contains no information on these types of
investments. Additionally, there is no reliable data available in Switzerland, especially not on
a sectoral level. We therefore use the data from sector 73 ("Research & Development") to
have a measure for these investments. Put dierently, we interpret the demand for goods from
sector 73, i.e. the row entries of this sector, as investments in R&D of the sectors demanding
these goods. To represent this interpretation in the IOT, we transferred these entries into a
new column (R&D investments). The column entries of sector 73 and its imports, exports,
value added, consumption and investments were added to other services (OSE), except for the
entry of labor. We use this entry as our benchmark value for research labor (LH). With this
procedure, we get sectoral values for R&D investments and an aggregate measure of research
labor. Research labor is then redivided to the sectors according to their share in total capital
use. This gives us a value for initial sectoral demand for research labor.
Furthermore, capital had to be split into two capital types, labeled K (accumulable capital)
and V K (non-accumulable capital). In the benchmark, the model is calibrated to a balanced
growth path, implying that all sectors grow at the same rate. This calibration requires that
the share of capital (1   ) in the production of intermediate goods has to be equal in all
sectors. The reason for this is that the capital share (or the gains of specialization) directly
aects the sectoral growth rates. Dierent capital shares would therefore imply dierent rates
of growth, which would not be consistent with the calibration. In the original data, there
are obviously large dierences in these shares. We solve this issue by setting the values of
accumulable capital (K) so that its share is equal in all sectors and by dening the residual
of initial capital as another input to intermediate production. K is the part of total capital
that can be accumulated via investments, while V K enters production of intermediate goods
at the same level as labor and energy and cannot be accumulated. V K can be thought of as
publicly provided capital (e.g. public infrastructure or services) in the sense of Barro (1990).
While helping to solve the benchmark calibration simulations show that V K has no distorting
eect on the quality of the results.
3.2 Parameters
The choice of parameter values, most notably of the elasticities of substitution, may have a
substantial inuence on the model results. It is therefore important to choose these values
6see Ramer (2010a) for details.
9carefully and reasonably. The elasticities of substitution are set in accordance with given em-
pirical estimations and studies (see e.g. Van der Werf (2007) and Okagawa and Ban (2008) for
estimations of elasticities related to the production process and Hasanov (2007) for estimates
for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the utility function). Sectoral dierences
in substitutability of inputs on the dierent levels of the production process are taken into
account by setting sectorally dierentiated values for the corresponding elasticities whenever
available and reasonable. An overview of the elasticities used is given in the appendix. We
also carefully performed a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the model results
with respect to variations of the values of the elasticities. The results proof to be robust, see
Ramer (2010b) for details.
From Table 1, see the appendix, it can be seen that most values for the elasticities are set
below unity. Exceptions are the trade elasticities and Y;CON. This implies a certain rigidity,
especially in the production process, and possibly limits the eects of political intervention as
inputs are not well substitutable on certain levels. There are two comments on this. Most of
the values are based on given estimations that prove that substitution possibilities are indeed
limited7. And, secondly, our model is still relatively exible in comparison to other models
(e.g. Ecoplan (2007)), who are even more stringent as far as the values for the elasticities in
the production processes are concerned. The Armington elasticities dier from the rest in the
sense that they are all set considerably above one. This basically reects the fact that it is of
limited relevance where the goods have been produced, irrespective of whether they are used
in production or consumed. This seems to be a reasonable assumption and is also common
in similar studies.
The model is calibrated such that it reects both projected output growth and growth
rates of the capital input. To be more precise, we assume that capital grows at an annual
rate of 1%. This matches the observed growth rate of capital goods in Switzerland since
1990. In our calibration, in combination with the before mentioned share of capital (1   ),
this leads to annual growth rate of about 1.33%, which is in line with the rate assumed in
the high GDP scenario of the Energy Perspectives. The share of capital essentially denes
the intensity of the spill-overs (i.e. the gains of specializations) and therefore also denes the
dierence between the growth rate of the inputs and the projected output growth rate. (1 )
is set to 0.25 in all sectors. Capital depreciates at a rate starting at 0.04. This rate rises by
a small amount every year, due the fact that capital and investments grow at dierent rates
in the model. To be able to calibrate the model correctly, we have to use a non-constant
depreciation rate. Using a calibration procedure by Paltsev (2004), we can then derive the
interest rate r (given the depreciation rate and the benchmark values for the capital stock
and investments). Given the values in our model, the interest rate is about 0.016 or 1.6%.
An important point to consider when interpreting the aggregate eects is that our bench-
7Van der Werf (2007) e.g. tests for Cobb-Douglas functions (i.e. an elasticity of substitution of 1) as a
representation of the substitutability between labor, energy and capital and shows that it is not an empirically
valid assumption.
10mark scenario is not a realistic business-as-usual case, because it abstracts from climate change
and its possible negative eects. A benchmark path that comes closer to reality would thus be
one that considers climate change, but does not include any political intervention. The Stern
Report includes projections of losses in GDP per capita, given undamped climate change. Due
to the long time horizon of these projections, there is obviously a considerable uncertainty on
the eects on per capita GDP, and the range of possible long-term impacts is large. However,
it seems clear that especially in later decades, the losses increase sharply in the absence of
political intervention. Depending on the assumptions on the impacts of climate change and on
what other eects are considered, losses could augment up to 35% in 2200. Policy measures
aiming at mitigating climate change should thus be able to signicantly reduce these losses
in later decades. Thus, although it may lead to larger losses in the shorter term, implement-
ing policy measures that mitigate climate change should be benecial as possibly even larger
losses in the long run can be avoided or at least reduced.
4 Simulation Results
We analyze the relatively stringent Copenhagen targets for Switzerland, without the possi-
bility of abatement osets abroad. These targets are based on the the agreement that the
increase in global temperature should be limited to 2 degrees Celsius. We introduce a CO2
tax in such a way that carbon emissions are reduced by 30% in 2020 and by 80% in 2050.
The tax is levied on the two fossil energy inputs (oil and gas), where oil is taxed at a higher
rate due to its higher CO2 intensity. The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Given the ambition of the target and the stringency of the policy, one would expect
strong impacts on consumption and welfare. However, this is not the case. The eects
on consumption and welfare are moderate. Welfare, which is measured by total discounted
consumption over the entire model horizon, decreases by 2.6%. The discount rate is about
1.1%, which is a comparably low value. Consumption over time declines steadily as long
as the tax is rising (i.e. until 2050 when the reduction target is reached), but at a small
scale. In 2020 (when the intermediate target of a 30% reduction is reached), consumption is
reduced by slightly more than 1%. In 2050, it is about 4.5% lower than in the benchmark.
This conrms previous ndings that even relatively stringent policies are economically feasible
from a consumer point of view.
**** Figure 1 ****
about here
Both consumption over time and overall welfare are only aected moderately, implying
that even restrictive policy measures come at a bearable cost. Figure 1 compares the growth
path of consumption with the benchmark path and highlights that the deviation from the
benchmark path is moderate. The level of consumption reached in 2050 in the scenario with
11the CO2 tax is reached about 2.5 years earlier in the benchmark case. One reason for this
moderate eect is that the share of energy in total consumption is only 2% and therefore very
small. Another reason lies in the induced growth eects. The direct eect of the tax through
an increase in the relative price of energy goods is thus only minimal. The CO2 tax also aects
the prices of non-energy goods, because they use energy as an input to production. Non-energy
goods enter consumption on the second level of the nested function and are assumed to be
good substitutes, implying that the household has a relatively exible consumption structure
that facilitates substitution of energy intensive for non-energy intensive goods.
**** Figure 2 ****
about here
At the sectoral level, the introduction of the tax leads to pronounced structural eects (see
Figure 2). Reactions in sectoral output range from an increase of about 35% in the machinery
industry to a decrease of more than 25% in other industries, compared to the benchmark
scenario. Three sectors have a higher output level in 2050 than in the absence of a CO2
tax, the remaining sectors are either not much aected or suer losses. The biggest gainer of
the policy is the machinery industry. It increases its output by about 35% until 2050. The
chemical industry and insurances also benet from the introduction of the CO2 tax. The
chemical industry gains slightly less than 10%, insurances about 1%. Several sectors incur
small losses in the range of 2% to 4%. These sectors include construction and most service
sectors (other services, health and banking and nancial services). The sectors that lose more
than 10% or even 20% (apart from the energy sector and the oil sector, which are not shown
in the graph) by 2050 are other industries, agriculture and transport.
There are various reasons for these structural changes. First, and most importantly, cer-
tain sectors benet from the substitution of capital for energy and the associated increased
investments. Physical investments require inputs from industries such as the machinery indus-
try. As capital stocks and thus investments increase signicantly in certain sectors, industries
providing investment goods naturally have a large benet. Moreover, the machinery industry
and the chemical sector are very capital and knowledge intensive themselves, which supports
their position as winning sectors. Interestingly, their growth rates are higher than in the
benchmark case and this right from the beginning, which exhibits the importance of forward
looking agents.
A second explanation is the energy intensity of the sectors, i.e. the relative importance
of energy as an input in the production of output of a sector. As energy enters sectoral
production at the level of the intermediate varieties, we measure the energy intensity by the
share of energy used in the production of the intermediate varieties ((1   L   V K) in model
parameters). The more energy a sector uses in its production process, the more it is exposed
to the tax (because the tax is levied on fossil energy) and the more it should be aected
by the tax. Transports, agriculture and other industries all have an energy share around
10%, which makes them the three most energy intensive sectors in the economy. Thus, the
12three sectors that have the highest energy intensity are those that suer the largest losses.
Construction also decreases its output, but at a smaller scale. Its energy intensity is just below
5%, which is the highest share after the three sectors discussed above. The negative eect on
the construction sector may however be overestimated in this model, because an important
aspect of Swiss energy policy is excluded. Increased standards for energy eciency for new
buildings and corresponding regulations for the renovation of existing infrastructure are an
important aspect of future reductions in energy demand. These regulations should clearly
be favorable for the construction sector if they were included in the model, as the demand
for construction services should increase signicantly. This mechanism being excluded, the
decrease in output of the construction sector can be readily explained by its relatively high
energy intensity.
The service sectors on the other hand generally have very low energy intensities. Their
shares are in a range between 2.6% for other services to 0.6% for banking and nancial
services. These low values show that services are clearly less exposed to the tax, and therefore
their reactions to the tax are very small. The fact that their output still slightly decreases
can be explained by their comparably low substitution possibilities. For the service sectors,
we assume a lower elasticity of substitution between the inputs in the production of the
intermediate varieties. The potential to avoid the tax is smaller than other sectors, most
notably than in the two industries that benet from the introduction of the CO2-tax. This
leads to a small decrease in output of most service sectors, despite the low energy shares.
The machinery industry and the chemical industry also use relatively little energy in their
production (the machinery industry has a high labor share, the chemical industry is very
capital intensive), and they both have better substitution possibilities for energy than the
service sectors (reected by higher values of X). These two characteristics give them a
comparative advantage over the other sectors and enable them to benet from the policy.
A nal reason for the structural changes are the linkages of the dierent sectors to the
energy sector and the oil sector. These linkages are reected in the use of outputs of other
sectors in the production process. As the oil sector and the energy sector reduce their output
by a substantial amount due to the tax, they also require fewer inputs from the other sectors.
The capital stocks (not shown here) exhibit a similar pattern as output, which means
that there is a clear indication that capital is shifted to the non-energy intensive sectors.
The non-energy intensive sectors are more attractive for investors in the presence of the
CO2-tax, because they are less aected by the tax. This leads to higher investments and
an increase in their capital stocks. Due to the direct link between capital accumulation and
sectoral development, the resulting sectoral growth rates vary considerably. But, despite the
ambitious reduction target, all sectors still exhibit positive growth rates, even if they perform
worse than in the benchmark.
To corroborate the results we have performed other policy simulations with the CITE
model. We have changed the time horizon to 2035 which, according to the expectation,
caused less welfare costs than those for 2050. We also found that distribution of tax revenues
13has an impact on consumption and welfare which depends on the considered time horizon;
for a shorter time horizon, research subsidies cannot develop their full advantages for the
economy while in the long run, these subsidies are superior to the redistribution of revenues
to households. For the small open economy Switzerland it makes a dierence which policies are
implemented in the other countries. Finally, a larger population must reduce carbon emissions
per capita more sharply so that the negative welfare eects are seen in more pronounced way.
5 Conclusions
To evaluate the long-run eects of climate policies, the paper integrates the achievements of
endogenous growth theory into CGE modeling. The continuous and sector-specic expansion
in capital varieties provides the basic mechanism for long-run development. We nd that the
fulllment of the carbon reduction commitments of the Copenhagen Accord in Switzerland
causes net welfare costs which are quite moderate but not negligible. It is plausible to argue
that - in view of these eects - such a climate policy be advocated, because the costs of
undamped climate change are likely to be higher. Considering the low discount rate and the
stringency of the studied carbon policy, a welfare reduction of 2.6% seems to be a relatively
moderate cost. This especially applies when the risks of large natural catastrophes can be
substantially reduced by appropriate policy interventions. But, of course, this assumes that
the world as a whole acts according to the Copenhagen Accord; only this entails the desired
eect on global emissions. Sectoral dierences in the simulated growth rates are signicant;
they reect energy intensities, sectoral linkages, and distinct specialization in capital goods.
The model assumptions are conservative in several respects. Technology development
is modeled in a top-down manner, which excludes the consideration of specic potential
technologies that might be highly inuential on energy eciency. Learning eects are not
a focus; accordingly, the build-up of new core competencies to be used as a comparative
advantage in international trade does not emerge. Finally, all elasticities and parameter
values are assumed in a conservative way.
To complete the evaluation of climate one would have to add secondary benets of energy
and carbon policy, such as positive eects on health and local pollution. In addition, the
extension of this endogenous growth model to a full-edged multi-region model would be
desirable. This is left for future research.
146 Literature
Armington, P.S.(1969): A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of pro-
duction, IMF Sta Papers 16, 159-178.
Baldwin, R.E. (1992): Measurable gains from trade, Journal of Political Economy, 100
(1), 162-174.
Barro, R. (1990): Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,
The Journal of Political Economy 98, 103-125.
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Galeotti, M. (2006): The dynamics of carbon and energy
intensity in a model of endogenous technical change, The Energy Journal, Endogenous Tech-
nological Change and the Economics of Atmospheric Stabilisation Special Issue, pp. 191-206.
Buonanno, P., Carraro, C., Castelnuovo, E., Galeotti, M. (2001): Emission trad-
ing restrictions with endogenous technological change, International Environmental Agree-
ments: Politics, Law and Economics 1, 379-395.
Burniaux et al (1992): GREEN a multi-sector, multi-region general equilibrium model
for quantifying the costs of curbing CO2 emissions: a technical manual, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 116, OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/744101452772.
Ecoplan (2007): Auswirkungen langfristig hoher Oelpreise. Einuss eines hohen langfristi-
gen Oelpreises auf Wirtschaftswachstum, Strukturwandel sowie Energieangebot und -nachfrage.
Bern.
Edenhofer, O., Bauer, N., Kriegler E. (2005): The impact of technological change
on climate protection and welfare: Insights from the model MIND, Ecological Economics 54
(2005), pp. 277-292.
Ethier, W. J. (1982): National and international returns to scale in the modern theory
of international trade, The American Economic Review 72 (3), 389-405.
Gerlagh, R. (2007): Measuring the value of induced technological change, Energy Policy
35, 5287{5297.
Goulder, L. H., Mathai, K. (2000): Optimal CO2 abatement in the presence of in-
duced technological change, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39 (2000),
pp. 1-38.
Goulder, L.H., Schneider, S.H. (1999): Induced technological change and the attrac-
tiveness of CO2 abatement policies, Resource and Energy Economics 21, 211-253.
Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E. (1991): Innovation and growth, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, USA.
Gr ubler, A., Messner, S. (1998): Technological change and the timing of mitigation
measures, Energy Economics 20, 495-512.
Hasanov, F. (2007): Housing, household portfolio, and intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=825324.
Kemfert, C. (2002): An integrated assessment model of economy-energy-climate - The
model WIAGEM, Integrated Assessment 3 (4), 281-298.
15Manne, A., Richels, R. (2004): The impact of learning-by-doing on the timing and
costs of CO2 abatement, Energy Economics 26, 603-619.
Messner, S. (1997): Endogenized technological learning in an energy systems model,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 7, 291-313.
Nathani, C., Wickart, M., van Nieuwkoop, R. (2008): Revision der IOT 2001
und Schaetzung einer IOT 2005 fuer die Schweiz, Centre for Energy Policy and Economics
(CEPE), ETH Zuerich; Ecoplan, Forschung und Beratung in Wirtschaft und Politik; Ruetter
+ Partner, Soziooekonomische Forschung + Beratung, Rueschlikon / Bern / Zuerich.
Nordhaus, W.D. (2002): Modeling induced innovation in climate-change policy, in:
Gr ubler, A., Nakicenovic, N.: Technological change and the environment, Resources for the
Future, Washington, D.C., USA.
Nordhaus, W.D., Yang, Z. (1996): A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model
of alternative climate-change strategies, The American Economic Review 86 (4), 741-765.
Okagawa, A., Ban, K. (2008): Estimation of substitution elasticities for CGE models,
Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy, Discussion
Paper 08-16.
Paltsev, S. (2004): Moving from static to dynamic general equilibrium economic models
(notes for a beginner in MPSGE), MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global
Change, Technical Note No. 4.
Popp, D. (2004): ENTICE: Endogenous technological change in the DICE model of
global warming, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48, 742-768.
Ramer, R. (2010a): Long-term energy policy in Switzerland and its economic eects:
Results from the CITE model, ETH Working Paper
Ramer, R. (2010b): The CITE Model: Data, Parametrization and Sensitivity Analysis,
ETH Working Paper.
Romer, P. M. (1987): Growth based on increasing returns due to specialization, The
American Economic Review 77 (2), 56-62.
Romer, P. M. (1990): Endogenous technical change, The Journal of Political Economy
98 (5), 71-102.
Rutherford, T. (2004): Dynamic general equilibrium with GAMS/MPSGE, Lecture
Notes prepared for the UNSW Workshop, February 24-27.
Schwark, F. (2010a): The theoretical foundation of the CITE model, ETH Working
Paper.
Schwark, F. (2010b): A comparison of growth dynamics: the CITE model vs. a model
with homogeneous capital, ETH Working Paper.
Solow, R. (1956): A contribution to the theory of economic growth, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 70(1), 65{94.
Spence, M. (1976): Product selection, xed costs, and monopolistic competition, Re-
view of Economic Studies 43, 217-235.
16Stern, N. (2007): The Stern Review Report: the Economics of Climate Change, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Van der Werf, E. (2007): Production functions for climate policy modeling: An em-
pirical analysis, Energy Economics 30 (2008), pp. 2964{2979.
177 Appendix
Parameter Description Value
Y;i Elasticity of substitution between Q and 0.392 (AGR)







X;i Elasticity of substitution between the three 0.7 (AGR, OIL,





E Elasticity of substitution between fossil 0.3
and non-fossil energy
I Elasticity of substitution between physical 0.3
investments and non-physical capital
N Elasticity of substitution between invest- 0.3
ments in R&D and research labor
C Elasticity of substitution between energy 0.5
and non-energy goods in consumption
W Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in 0.6
the welfare function




T Elasticity of transformation 1
where: Agriculture (AGR), Rened Oil Products (OIL), Chemical Industry (CHM), Machinery and Equipment
(MCH), Energy (EGY), Construction (CON), Transport (TRN), Banking and Financial Services (BNK), Insurances




Figure 2: Sectoral output.
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